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Recent Ohio Procedure Changes
Lee E. Skeel*
by giving consideration to the recent
cases dealing with appellate procedure, before considering
statutory changes. The questions of when a motion for new trial
tolls the time for giving notice of appeal, and what constitutes a
final order, have been given consideration in recent cases. The
office of the motion for a new trial as provided by R. C. 2321.17
is a re-examination, in the same court, of the issues, after a final
order or judgment. Under such circumstances, either after trial
of the issues in the original case, or where subsequent to the
original judgment, upon motion issues of law or fact are properly
presented on matters separate and apart from the issues tried
originally, a motion seeking a new trial of such order will toll
the time for giving notice of appeal. In the case of Mullineaux v.
Gary (79 0. L. A., 31, 154 N. E. 2d, 96) the first headnote states:
In a hearing upon a motion to distribute appeal bond money,
the appeal having been dismissed, one of the issues is the
extent of appellee's damage because of the appeal not being
properly brought, a factual question, the determination of
which is subject to re-examination upon a motion for a new
trial.
But where the proceeding is one seeking the vacation of a judgment after term, which in reality is a request (either by motion
or petition) for a new trial, a motion for rehearing (or new
trial) is not provided for and, if filed, does not toll the time for
appeal. In the case of Gynn v. Gynn (106 Ohio App., 132) a
petition to vacate a judgment after term under the provisions of
R. C. 2325.01, et seq., was filed July 1, 1955 (three years after
the decree for divorce was journalized). Upon trial, the court
denied the relief prayed for on May 11, 1957. A motion for new
trial was filed May 21, 1957, and overruled on July 26, 1957, and
the notice of appeal on questions of law was filed on August 14,
1957, nineteen days after the overruling of the motion for new
trial, directed to the final order of May 11, 1957, denying defendant's petition to vacate. The court held that the final order
was the overruling of defendant's petition to vacate (after term)
the previous judgment, which in reality was a motion for new
trial, and that a request for a rehearing of such "petition" did
not toll the time for filing an appeal. A motion for new trial is
provided only for the re-examination of the issues in a proceeding after trial in the first instance.
T MIGHT BE WELL TO BEGIN

* Judge of the Ohio Court of Appeals, Cleveland; President of ClevelandMarshall Law School; etc.
[Note: This is a revision of an address recently delivered by Judge Skeel
to the Annual Meeting of Judges of the Courts of Appeals of Ohio.]
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There have been a number of cases dismissing appeals on
law and fact and retaining the appeals on questions of law where
the subject of the action does not come within the provisions of
R. C. 2501.02. Alimony, Williams v. Williams (109 Ohio App.,
399); Decision of Board of Tax Appeals, Bliss v. Bowers (109
Ohio App., 443); Alienation of Affections, Franklin v. Schreyer
(82 0. L. A., 545); Decree disorganizing a Conservancy District,
In re Scioto, Sandusky Conservancy District (82 0. L. A., 522).
The most interesting of these cases is the determination that an
appeal from a local administrative agency under Chapter 2506
of the Revised Code must be on questions of law. In the case of
Vlad v. Cleveland (82 0. L. A., 602) the court said:
While appeals under R. C. 119.12 are limited to state agencies, R. C. 2505.03 and Chapter 2506 of the Revised Code,
when taken together, provide for appeals to the courts from
administrative agencies of all political subdivisions of the
government, state or local.
The provisions of Chapter 2505 of the Revised Code having
to do with appeals on law and fact, as limited by R. C. 2501.02,
are not applicable to appeals from administrative agencies.
(Sections 119.12 and 2506.01 to 2506.04.)
The fact that the notice of appeal sets out that the appeal
is on law and fact is not determinative of the nature of the appeal.
Chapter 2506 of the Revised Code, providing procedure on
appeal from final orders of administrative agencies to the common pleas court, is supplemental to and additional to any other
procedural rules on appeal provided by law. Its importance is
to be found in the fact that Chapter 2505 of the Revised Code,
while providing for appeals from final orders of administrative
officers, tribunals or commissions (R. C. 2505.02), almost completely neglects the procedure to be followed after notice of
appeal. (R. C. 2505.08, amended effective October 4, 1955, dealing with the filing of the transcript and the original papers in
the reviewing court, can have application only in appeals from
final orders or judgments of judicial tribunals. This is the only
section in the chapter dealing with transcripts. R. C. 2506.02 requires the agency from which an appeal is taken to file, within
thirty days of the filing of the notice of appeal, a complete transcript of all the original papers, testimony and evidence offered
or heard and taken into consideration in issuing the order appealed from. This provision under some circumstances presents
an almost impossible task for the agency. It is the exception and
not the rule that the testimony of witnesses before local administrative agencies is preserved by reporters' shorthand notes.
There is no provision of law (except as to some state agencies)
requiring the reporting of such testimony. Section 2506.03 of the
Revised Code fills the gap. The circumstances under which the
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evidence to be considered on appeal may be taken to supplement that, if any, contained in the transcript, is here provided
for. This section provides that the trial shall be as in civil
actions, confined, however, to the transcript unless it appears
on the face of the record or by the affidavit of the appellant that
the transcript does not contain:
A. All the evidence admitted or proffered;
B. Or that the appellant was not permitted to be heard in
person or by his attorney in opposition to the order
1. To present his position or argument;
2. To offer and examine witnesses in support of his
position;
3. To cross-examine witnesses offered against his position;
4. To offer evidence to refute evidence offered in opposition to his contentions;
5. To proffer admissible evidence into the record, if denied admittance by the agency;
C. The testimony presented to the agency was not under
oath;
D. Appellant could not present evidence because of the lack
of power of subpoena on the part of the agency or the
refusal, after request, of the privilege of subpoena when
the agency possesses such power;
E. The agency failed to file with the transcript conclusions
of fact supporting the order.
In any case, the appeal is to be heard on the transcript and
such additional evidence as may be introduced by any party
under any of the circumstances set out in the statute. The
privilege of calling for cross-examination witnesses who had
testified in opposition to a party is also provided for.
It is clear from this provision of the chapter that all that is
intended is to supplement (when necessary) or to create a
proper record upon which the appeal is to be heard. A trial
de novo is not provided for. The judgment which the court is
authorized to enter is also limited by R. C. 2506.04 to one which
is usually entered in an appeal on questions of law. The entry
deals with the order of the agency and not a judgment independent of the order of the agency. The court is authorized to
adjudge the decision of the agency as to whether or not it is
unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or
unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence on the record.
Consistent with such finding, the court may affirm, reverse, vacate or modify an order, adjudication or decision of the agency,
or remand, requiring the agency to enter an order consistent
with the finding and opinion of the court.
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It should be noted that the power of the court is circumscribed in such appeals by the provisions of Chapters 2505 and
2506 of the Revised Code. Chapter 2505 provides for two appeals, one on questions of law and one on questions of law and
fact. Law and fact appeals are limited by R. C. 2501.02 to what
were formerly chancery cases. Therefore, without a provision
such as is found in R. C. 143.27, amended effective November 2,
1959, providing for a law and fact appeal for a police officer when
removed from office or disciplined by the Civil Service Commission, the appeal from final orders of administrative agencies,
based on the authority of Chapter 2506 of the Revised Code,
must be "appeal on questions of law." See, Fleischmann, et al. v.
Medina Supply Co., -

Ohio App., -

decided June 1,

1960

(Ninth District).
The jurisdiction of courts inferior to the common pleas court
has been the subject of change by the 103rd General Assembly.
The mayor's court is now without any civil jurisdiction, is
also without the power to act as a committing magistrate in
felony cases, is limited in criminal prosecutions to hear violations
of the ordinances of the city or village of the mayor's jurisdiction and moving traffic violations on state highways within said
city or village, within the district of a county court and in cities
and villages in the territory of a municipal court, except in the
city or village which is the site of such municipal court. R. C.
1907.031, R. C. 1905.19, R. C. 1901.04, R. C. 1905.01 to 1905.09,
inclusive. The mayor's court has no jurisdiction to try a criminal
prosecution in which the defendant is entitled to a jury trial,
unless the right to trial by jury is waived in writing. R. C.
2937.08, R. C. 2938.04. (R. C. 1905.05 is repealed by implication.)
The county court, replacing the court of the justice of the
peace, has civil jurisdiction as provided by Chapters 1909, 1917,
1919, 1923, 2931 and the other chapters of the Revised Code set
out in R. C. 1907.012, which in effect confers on such court the
same civil jurisdiction formerly possessed by the justice of the
peace within its district, except that its monetary jurisdiction is
now increased whereby in actions for money or personal property
it has exclusive jurisdiction where the money or the value of the
property claimed is $300 or less, and concurrent jurisdiction in
actions for money or property with the common pleas court up
to $500. R. C. 1909.04 to 1909.08, inclusive.
The criminal jurisdiction of the county court is provided for
by R. C. 1907.012. This section, in addition to the civil jurisdiction as above set out, provides: ".

.

. shall have jurisdiction in

motor vehicle violations and all other misdemeanors." However,
the last paragraph of the section provides: "Effective January 1,
1963, county courts shall be considered courts of record for all
purposes of law." This section can have no other effect than to
make of county courts, courts not of record until January 1, 1936.
This means that, by the provisions of R. C. 2937.08 and R. C.
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2938.04, the county court is without jurisdiction to try a jury case,
and unless a defendant who is charged with a violation of law
or ordinance for which a fine in excess of $50 or a jail penalty,
or both, is provided, waives (in writing) the right to trial by
jury, the county court must commit such defendant to a court
of record for trial. The district of the county court is all that
part of a county which is not included in the territory of a municipal court in such county. There are a number of counties
where there are no municipal courts, so that such bindover must
be to the common pleas court. Where there is a municipal court
in the county, the judge of the county court has the power to,
and must, send the case to a court of record "set by the magistrate," which could be either the common pleas court or the
municipal court. Should the municipal court be chosen, and the
jurors are selected from the territory of the municipal court,
as is permissible under R. C. 1901.25, then the jury trial would
be before jurors coming exclusively from the municipal court
territory for a violation occurring outside such territory and
within the county court district. This result follows because of
the requirements of R. C. 1901.25 providing that jurors may be
chosen as provided by rules of court. If the court sets up its own
system, the jurors must of necessity come from the territory of
its jurisdiction. This section also provides that the court, by
rule, may call on the county jury commission to furnish jurors,
but that "selection shall be made from residents within the territory and those appearing to reside outside the territory shall be
returned to the jury wheel." R. C. 1913.14, dealing with selecting
jurors for the county court, contains identical provisions. R. C.
2938.14, dealing with the magistrate's courts, provides that jurors
may be drawn in the manner provided by the act creating the
court, and that no challenge to the array shall be sustained because some of the venire men are not residents of the territory
of the court, if it appears that the venire was regularly drawn
and certified by the "jury commission of the county or municipality, as the case may be." While the county court cannot
try a case to a jury in a criminal prosecution until it becomes a
court of record (January 1, 1963), yet each of the quoted sections seems to show a legislative purpose to confine the selection
of a jury to residents of the district or territory of the court
where the unlawful act was committed. The history of selection
of jurors supports the theory that they should be drawn from
the people living in the "vicinage" or political subdivision where
the crime was committed. This is the basis of our constitutional
provision requiring the state to try a felony case before a jury
of the county where it is alleged that the crime was committed.
The same reasoning would seem to dictate that jurors should be
selected from the political subdivision in which a misdemeanor
is alleged to have been committed.
Upon the creation of a municipal court, which is a court
of record, the mayor of the city or village where it is located
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is excluded from all jurisdiction as a magistrate in such city or
village. The mayors of other cities or villages within the territory of such court may continue to exercise jurisdiction in the
trial of ordinance violations and moving traffic violations on
state highways within such cities or villages, limited as above
set out. R. C. 1901.04, R. C. 1907.031, R. C. 2937.08, and R. C.
2938.04.
The monetary jurisdiction of municipal courts has been increased: $7500 in municipal courts in Cuyahoga County (thirteen in number), $5000 for the Columbus Municipal Court, and
a limit of $3000 in all other municipal courts. Municipal courts
have jurisdiction to try and enter final judgment in all misdemeanor cases and ordinance violations, with or without the intervention of a jury. A jury must be demanded in writing within three days of the trial or one day after the trial is set, whichever is the later. R. C. 2938.04. This section is in direct conflict
with R. C. 1901.24 (found in the municipal court act), which
latter section must be considered as repealed by implication.
R. C. 1913.09, dealing with county courts, has the same conflict.
One change in the uniform municipal court act, applicable
to both civil and criminal cases, is R. C. 1901.30 (E), which provides that the clerk of the court shall strike a notice of appeal
from the files if a precipe for transcript is not filed and the required fee paid therefor within ninety days of the filing of the
notice of appeal. Other changes, insofar as civil process is concerned, have to do with territorial jurisdiction of certain courts,
equity powers of certain courts, substituting references to justices of the peace still remaining in some statutes to "county
courts," adopting and publishing rules, providing for branch
offices, and the like.
Criminal proceedings in municipal courts have been the subject of change. R. C. 1901.21 was reenacted, effective November
6, 1959. (It was passed in House Bill 571 of the 103rd General
Assembly and approved by the Governor on August 6, 1959,
which is the same date on which Senate Bill 73, of which R. C.
2938.15 is a part, became law, (under Article II, Section 16 of
the Constitution). By the provisions of this section, the procedure in criminal cases is that provided for police courts of municipal corporations; or if not there provided, then the procedure
provided for mayor's courts is to apply; but if not there provided,
then the procedure provided for in county courts shall apply.
R. C. 1913.31 to R. C. 1913.34, inclusive, set out clearly the procedural rules for filing bills of exception in county courts, mayor's
courts and police courts in both civil and criminal cases. The
last effective date of these sections is January 1, 1958, so they
have been recently re-examined by the legislature. These sections are direct, positive and specific, so that the provisions of
R. C. 2938.15, which are general in character, providing that
"rules of evidence and procedure, including those governing
notices, proof of special matter, depositions, and joinder of de-
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fendants and offenses set forth in Chapter 2945 of the Revised
Code, which are not, by their nature, inapplicable to the trial of
misdemeanors, shall prevail in trials under Chapter 2938 of the
Revised Code where no special provision (is) made in such
chapter * * *" do not here apply. The effect of the application

of the sections in Chapter 1913 of the Revised Code is to fix the
time for filing a bill of exceptions in magistrate's courts as within
ten days of the judgment or overruling a motion for new trial,
and not thirty days as provided in R. C. 2945.65. The rule for
filing a motion for new trial in criminal cases in municipal courts
is provided for by R. C. 2931.15, amended and passed in Senate
Bill 133, which bill was likewise passed and became law (under
the Constitution) (approved August 12, 1959) subsequent to
Senate Bill 73 (August 6, 1959). The time for filing a motion
for new trial in municipal courts would come to the same thing
in either event, because R. C. 2945.79 to R. C. 2945.83 are controlling under either of the statutes referred to (R. C. 2931.15 and
R. C. 2938.15).
There are two other legislative changes dealing with appeals
from magistrate's courts that need to be mentioned. R. C. 2953.05
now provides that an appeal as of right from judgments in criminal cases in magistrate's courts must be filed within ten days of
the judgment or final order. This amendment was not too clearly
worded, but, when it refers to "such judgment or final order," it
must be considered as meaning ten days from the judgment or
the overruling of a motion for new trial or from the date of the
suspending of the imposition of sentence and putting the defendant on probation. R. C. 2953.051, effective January 1, 1960, provides that on the filing of a motion for new trial or a notice of
appeal in a misdemeanor or violation of an ordinance, the execution of the sentence shall be suspended, if the defendant is then
on bail, and such bail shall continue, with the power vested in
the trial court or the appellate court to order new or additional
bail.
Mention should be made of the fact that Senate Bill 73, passed
and approved on August 6, 1959, effective by its provisions January 1, 1960, amended procedure as outlined in Chapter 2937 of
the Revised Code dealing with arrest and preliminary hearings
in magistrate's courts. Chapter 2938, dealing with trials in magistrate's courts, is completely new. Under Chapter 2937, the preliminary rights of defendants to be informed as to who filed the
complaint, rights on arraignment, bail, employing counsel, continuance and pleas, including the plea of "no contest," and to be
informed as to right to trial by jury and the like, are now provided for. In a preliminary hearing in a felony case, a plea of
guilty must be in writing. The defendant must be informed
as to the probable penalty, if convicted, and as to his right to a
preliminary hearing, and also the effect of offering evidence in
his behalf, or testifying himself or making a statement in explanation of the evidence.
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An amendment in Chapter 2945 of the Revised Code (a part
of the code on criminal procedure), that is, R. C. 2945.65, needs
to be considered. This amendment corrected the failure to spell
out the time for filing a bill of exceptions in a criminal case. This
failure was the subject dealt with by the Supreme Court in State
v. Nickles (159 Ohio St., 353, 112 N. E. 2d 531). The section
now provides that the bill of exceptions may be filed within
thirty days of the judgment and sentence, or within thirty days
from overruling a motion for new trial, or a like period from
suspending the imposition of sentence and placing the defendant
on probation, whichever is the later entry. This section also
provides that, except where the appeal is on the sufficiency of
the evidence or that the judgment is contrary to law, where a
complete bill of exceptions is necessary, the bill of exceptions
need contain only so much of the evidence as is necessary to
demonstrate the error. Upon hearing, the reviewing court, however, may order a complete bill, if necessary to consider the case,
which addition to the bill of exceptions may be fied subsequent
to the time fixed within which a bill of exceptions must be filed.
The amendment to R. C. 2953.03, effective January 1, 1960,
creates a conflict with R. C. 2953.04. Formerly, R. C. 2953.03
provided that upon application of defendant or someone in his
behalf and the payment of the proper fee, the clerk or one
charged by law with keeping the public records or docket entries,
as provided by R. C. 2953.02, shall make and deliver to the accused
or his counsel a certified transcript of the record. It was also
the duty of such officer to deliver the original papers to the
clerk of the reviewing court. R. C. 2953.04 provides that the
judgments and final orders to be reviewed by appeal are instituted by filing a notice of appeal in the court rendering the
judgment or final order. Upon filing the notice of appeal, there
shall be filed in the appellate court (by the defendant or his
counsel) the transcript and the original papers as provided by
R. C. 2953.03. It is also provided that the appellant shall file his
brief with the transcript and the appellee is to file his brief
fifteen days thereafter. By the amendment to R. C. 2953.03, the
clerk of the trial court is now required to file the transcript as
well as the original papers in the reviewing court within five days
fiing of an application therefor and the tender of the
proper fee. It would seem, therefore, that the appellant should
fie his assignments of error and brief, after serving a copy thereof on the prosecutor, within five days of filing his application for
transcript, or, upon notice to the prosecutor seek an order of
the reviewing court fixing the time for filing assignments of
error and brief.
Some mention should be made of the rules for appeal from
judgments or final orders of the juvenile court.
The juvenile court is vested with both civil and criminal
jurisdiction. In dealing with the question of whether a child
under eighteen years of age is a neglected, dependent or de-
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linquent child, the court exercises its special jurisdiction, which
must be classed as civil, and is subject when applicable to civil
procedure as distinguished from procedure applicable to criminal cases. This is clearly true in bastardy cases. When trying
an adult for neglecting or contributing to the delinquency of a
child under eighteen years of age, the court is exercising its
power to try a criminal case. The procedure upon trial and on
appeal in criminal cases is provided for by R. C. 2151.43 to R. C.
2151.52, inclusive. In such cases, appellate procedure is as provided in common pleas court. R. C. 2151.52. The latter part of
R. C. 2151.52, requiring leave to appeal to the court of appeals
by the appellate court in a criminal case charging an adult with
criminal conduct under the juvenile court act, must be considered as to its constitutionality. The constitution fixes the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. The juvenile court is a court of
record. It is not inferior to the common pleas court. The constitution, in dealing with the jurisdiction of the court of appeals,
provides "* * * and such jurisdiction as may be provided by law
to review, affirm, modify, set aside or reverse judgments or final
orders * * * of courts of record." The phrase "as provided by
law" must mean the method by which an appeal is taken and
not the right of the legislature to prevent or prohibit an appeal
to the court of appeals from a judgment of a court of record
exercising its original jurisdiction. The supreme court, in the
case of Green v. Insurance Co. (156 Ohio St., 1, 100 N. E. 2d
211), said, in holding a part of R. C. 2505.02 unconstitutional
(that part of the section declaring the granting of a motion for
new trial a final order) as follows:
The amendment of Section 6, Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio, adopted November 7, 1944, and effective January 1, 1945, is the sole source of jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and such jurisdiction can not be enlarged by the
General Assembly. The latter may legislate as to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review, affirm, modify,
set aside or reverse final orders or judgments of boards,
commissions, officers, tribunals or courts of record inferior
to the Court of Appeals, but it has no authority to confer
on the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review any orders
which do not constitute final orders or judgments.
If the statute requiring leave to appeal is interpreted as meaning that the court of appeals could refuse the right of appeal
from a judgment of a court of record without a full consideration
of the case on the merits, then defendants charged with misdemeanors under the juvenile court act would be deprived of
rights afforded others charged with like crimes under general
law. What rule is to guide the court of appeals when passing
on the question of whether or not leave should be granted "for
good cause shown"? Certainly, the refusal to grant the right of
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appeal would violate the equal protection clause and due process
clause of the Constitution of the United States. Where the
original jurisdiction of the court of appeals is invoked, a party
feeling aggrieved may appeal to the supreme court without securing leave. It must also be noted that no such limitation is
provided for appeals of the judgments of the juvenile court finding a child under eighteen years to be delinquent, neglected or
dependent. Any doubt that such judgments are appealable is
now set at rest by R. C. 2501.02, where an appeal from such
orders is provided. There are a number of cases decided prior
to the amendment of R. C. 2501.02, sustaining the right to such
appeal. It is true that in the case of State v. Parks (105 Ohio
App., 208, 152 N. E. 2d 154) it was held that unless leave to appeal was requested and granted under R. C. 2151.52, upon good
cause shown, after notice to the prosecutor, an appeal will be
denied and the judgment affirmed. It is difficult to see how a
judgment can be affirmed if the appeal is dismissed as not properly within the jurisdiction of the court for failure of procedural
requirements.
In addition to the interpretation of the constitution as not
authorizing the legislature to empower a court exercising appellate jurisdiction to refuse the right of appeal because "in its
judgment" the appellant failed to show good cause as the basis
of being afforded such right, such limitation being applicable
only under a "special" chapter of the Revised Code dealing with
juveniles, and not being applicable to defendants (who, of
course, cannot choose the forum in which their guilt or innocence is to be tried) charged under general law with a like
offense, is unconstitutional for not affording equal protection
under the law. R. C. 2151.52 is the only statute in the criminal
code of Ohio under which a defendant is required to get leave
to appeal in the court to which the appeal is taken from a judgment or final order of a trial court rendered in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction. This part of the section requiring leave
must be unconstitutional, being in violation of Article I, Sections
2 and 16 of the Constitution of Ohio and the due process section
of the Constitution of the United States. In Volume II, Ohio
Jurisprudence 2d, paragraph 680, page 25, under the title, "Constitutional Law," it is said:
A statute which discriminates between persons similarly
situated by not allowing an appeal on equal terms denies
the equal protection of the laws.
As authority for this statement, the case of Maynard v. B. F.
Goodrich Co. (144 Ohio St., 22, 56 N. E. 2d 195) is cited. This
case was concerned in part with the circumstances under which
the filing of a motion for new trial was a prerequisite to a review
of the case in a reviewing court. On page 27 of the opinion, the
quotation above set forth from Ohio Jurisprudence 2d is found
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with a number of supporting authorities. There should be no
question but that that part of the statute (R. C. 2151.52) requiring leave to appeal by an adult found guilty upon trial for the
commission of a crime defined in the juvenile court act is clearly
unconstitutional. While not directly in point because the case
was tried before the amendment to the constitution in 1944, yet
in principle the case of State ex rel. Medical Center v. Wallace,
Clerk (107 Ohio St., 557, 140 N. E. 305) supports this conclusion.
In this case, a similar provision for procuring leave to appeal in
forcible entry cases was included in the Cleveland Municipal
Court Act. The court held such provision unconstitutional in
attempting to control the jurisdiction of the court of appeals by
statute.
One remaining question is to determine what procedure to
follow in appeals from judgments or final orders of the juvenile
court finding a child to be neglected, dependent, or delinquent.
There is no provision in the juvenile court act (Chapter 2151 of
the Revised Code) covering this question in civil cases comparable to R. C. 2151.52, which covers it in the exercise by
juvenile court of its jurisdiction in criminal charges against
adults. The time for filing notice of appeal in civil cases is clearly
provided for by R. C. 2505.07 (twenty days from the judgment
or final order) but the right to file a motion for new trial, or
the time in which to fie a bill of exceptions as set forth in Chapter 2321 of the Revised Code for the common pleas court, is not
referred to in Chapter 2151 of the Revised Code. However,
R. C. 2153.17 (Chapter 2153 of the Revised Code provides for
the creation of the Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County) provides:
The sections of the Revised Code regulating the manner and
grounds of appeal from any judgment, order, or decree rendered by the court of common pleas in the exercise of
juvenile jurisdiction shall apply to the juvenile court.
By interpretation, this section might be said to apply, although the language is somewhat confused. Where a right to
appeal a judgment of the juvenile court, entered within its jurisdiction to deal with the dependency, neglect, and delinquency of
children under eighteen years of age, is clearly granted by the
constitution and also by statute, and there are general statutes
setting out the procedure on appeal from judgments of courts of
record, such statutes must be held to apply where there are no
special statutes dealing with or spelling out the procedure in
such cases.
In the case of State ex rel., Prescott v. Hansueck, Justice of
the Peace (19 C. C., 303) it was held:
Where the constitution itself bestows upon a court jurisdiction over a subject matter, if that court is an appellate court,
it may prescribe a mode and rules and regulations for bringing a case before it on error * * *
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The theory of this case was followed in Miller v. Akron (16
C. C. N. S., 554) where the right of appeal was provided by
statute but the statutes on procedure had been repealed. The
court held that the general procedure on appeal where special
procedure was not provided should apply.
The conclusion must be, therefore, that where the constitution provides the right to appeal all judgments and final orders
entered by courts of record to the court of appeals (Article IV,
Section 6 of the Constitution of Ohio), and where R. C. 2501.02
specifically provides for appeals from judgments of the juvenile
court (a court of record) from its findings, orders, or judgments
that a child is delinquent, neglected or dependent, and when
R. C. 2505.07 specifically sets out the time and manner of giving
notice of appeal applicable to appeals to the court of appeals, and
when it has been clearly determined that a proceeding in the
juvenile court to determine whether or not a child is a neglected,
dependent or delinquent child is a civil proceeding (State v.
Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N. E. 2d, 510), it must follow
that, insofar as applicable, Chapter 2321 of the Revised Code,
providing for filing motions for new trial and filing bills of exceptions, must apply to such cases.
The legislature will be called upon, when it meets in January, 1961, to correct and harmonize the difficulties above referred
to, and many others. It is suggested that any matters of this
character coming to the attention of any judges, which should
be called to the attention of the legislature, be submitted to our
Chief Justice.
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